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aBstract
Since the first introduction of a provision dealing with the use of (lethal) 
force in effecting an arrest in South African criminal procedure in 1917, 
the provisions have been amended a total of four times with a possible 
fifth amendment soon to be passed in terms of the Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Bill B39 – 2010. In this article the wording, interpretation and 
development of the provisions from its common-law roots and the first 
provision in the 1917 Act to the latest proposed amendment will be analysed 
and compared.
1.  Introduction
With the recent proposed amendments to section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 dealing with the use of lethal force in effecting 
an arrest (Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill B39 – 2010), this 
controversial provision has certainly become one of the most amended 
provisions in the history of South African criminal procedure. Since 
its initial introduction by the legislator in the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act 31 of 1917, this provision has been amended a total of 
four times with a possible fifth amendment on the horizon. In this 
article the development of this provision, from its first enactment in 
the 1917 Act to the proposed amendments of the 2010 Amendment Bill 
will be discussed to provide an informed overview of the development 
of the law of criminal procedure in this regard.
The analysis will commence with a short discussion on the early 
history and development of the concept of lethal force in effecting 
an arrest, whereafter the relevant provisions of the 1917 Criminal 
Procedure Act and a chronological exposition of the major amendments
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to this particular provision in the South African law will be analysed. 
This exposition will include a discussion of section 37 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 56 of 1955 and the relevant provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. With regard to the latter Act, a further 
demarcation will be made between the period before and after the 
establishment of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, and the 
amendment provision in section 7 of the Judicial Second Amendment 
Act 122 of 1998. The analysis will conclude with a critical discussion 
of the amendments proposed by the Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Bill 2010. The provisions of the Amendment Bill are aimed at clearing 
up alleged ambiguity in section 49 of the present Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977, and if promulgated, may provide police officials with 
extensive powers to use lethal force.
2.  The early history of the use of lethal force in effecting 
an arrest
Cowling, citing Milton, submits that the use of lethal force in effecting 
an arrest has its roots in ‘… primitive institutions of the English 
common law …’1 The two main institutions in English common law 
that form the basis of this provision are the system of outlawry and the 
concept of felony. Outlawry, according to Milton, is ‘a crude system of 
law enforcement’ whereby those that committed serious offences were 
regarded as being at war with the community and were thus declared 
to be outside the protection of the law.’2 It was then ‘the duty of every 
citizen to track down and kill those that were declared to be outlaws.’3 
The concept of felony, on the other hand, referred to criminal acts of 
a particularly reprehensible nature,4 which were punishable by the 
death penalty.5 Milton argues that it was because the lives of outlaws 
and felons were effectively declared to be forfeit that deadly force was 
warranted in effecting their arrest.6
1 M Cowling ‘The licence to flee? Recent restrictions on the use of deadly force in 
effecting an arrest’ in SV Hoctor and PJ Schwikkard (eds) The Exemplary Scholar: 
Essays in Honour of John Milton (2007) 103; JRL Milton ‘Ultima ratio legis: The use 
of deadly force in effecting arrests’ in JA Coetzee (ed) Gedenkbundel: HL Swanepoel 
(1976) 142. Milton argues that the use of deadly force in Roman-Dutch Law primarily 
dealt with situations where one had to protect one’s property and not where the 
main object was to effect an arrest. However, Rumpff CJ refers to Van der Keessel’s 
Praelections ad Jus Criminale in the case of Matlou v Makhubedu 1978 (1) SA 946 
(A), where it is held that the use of deadly force to effect an arrest is only warranted 
in cases of self-defence.
2 Cowling op cit (n1) 103 citing Milton op cit (n1) at 142.
3 Cowling op cit (n1) 103 citing Milton op cit (n1) at 142.
4 For example robbery, arson, rape and homicide.
5 Cowling op cit (n1) 103 citing Milton op cit (n1) at 142.
6 Cowling op cit (n1) 103 citing Milton op cit (n1) at 143. 
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3.  The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917
In 1917 the criminal codes of the four pre-union colonies in South 
Africa were repealed,7 and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
31 of 1917 was enacted. Section 44(1) of this Act governed the use of 
lethal force in effecting an arrest. This section read as follows:
‘when any peace officer or private person authorised or required under this 
Act, to arrest or assist in arresting any person who has committed or is 
on reasonable grounds suspected of having committed any of the offences 
mentioned in the first schedule to this Act, attempts to make such arrest, 
and the person so attempted to be arrested flees or resists and cannot be 
apprehended and prevented from escaping by other means than by such 
officer or private person killing the person so fleeing or resisting, such killing 
shall be deemed in law justifiable homicide.’8
The section made provision for the use of lethal force in instances 
where no other means were available to the arrestor. It was required 
that the suspect be suspected on reasonable grounds; thus requiring 
the presence of an objective belief on the part of the arrestor when 
making use of (lethal) force to effect an arrest. The provision also 
directly authorised private persons to use lethal force in effecting an 
arrest, placing peace officers and private persons on the same footing. 
It is interesting to note however, that in terms of English law, a clear 
distinction was made between police officers and private persons with 
regard to the use of lethal force to effect an arrest; if an arrestee was 
found to be innocent of the crime he/she was suspected of having 
committed, lethal force would only be justified in the case of police 
officers and not private persons.9 The distinction between peace 
officers and private persons was done away with in the amendment to 
the 1917 Act and section 56 of the 1955 Act merely refers to persons 
authorised in terms of the latter Act.
It is also interesting to note that the use of lethal force in effecting 
an arrest was justified if the suspect was suspected, on reasonable 
grounds, of having committed any of the offences listed in the First 
Schedule of the Act. This obviously included murder and other serious 
offences such as rape, but it also included less serious transgressions 
like sedition (subversion), sodomy (this is no longer an offence in terms 
of South African criminal law),10 receiving stolen property knowing 
7 Cape: Ordinance 40 of 1828; Natal: Ordinance 18 of 1856; Transvaal: Ordinance 1 of 
1903; Orange Free State: Ordinance 12 of 1902. 
8 Section 44(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917.
9 Cowling op cit (n1) 116.
10 See Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917; the common-
law proscription of sodomy was declared unconstitutional in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1517 (CC).
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that the property was obtained illegally and any attempt to commit 
any of the offences listed in Schedule 1. Thus, although the presence 
of an objective belief on the part of the arrestor was required when 
making use of lethal force in effecting an arrest, the requirement of 
proportionality between the force used in order to effect an arrest 
and the alleged offence committed by the suspect was lacking. The 
requirement of proportionality became much more prominent in the 
1998 amendment of this provision.
4.  The Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955
In 1955 the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act11 was replaced by 
the Criminal Procedure Act.12 Section 37 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 1955 makes provision for the use of lethal force in effecting an 
arrest.
‘(1)  Whenever any person authorized under this Act to arrest or assist in 
arresting any person who has committed or is on reasonable grounds 
suspected of having committed any offence mentioned in the First 
Schedule, attempts to arrest any such person and such person flees or 
resists and cannot be arrested and prevented from escaping by other 
means than by killing the person so fleeing or resisting, such killing 
shall be deemed in law justifiable homicide.
(2)  Nothing in this section shall authorise the killing of a person who is not 
accused or suspected of having committed an offence mentioned in the 
First Schedule.’
While the use of lethal force in effecting an arrest was limited in 
the 1917 Act only to peace officers and private persons authorised or 
required to act in terms of the provisions of the 1917 Act, the 1955 
provision allowed for any person, specifically authorised by the Act, to 
use lethal force in effecting an arrest. However, in real terms there is 
probably not much difference between the effect of the wording in the 
1917 and the 1955 Act in this regard. The only other difference in the 
wording of this 1955 provision compared to the 1917 provision is the 
inclusion of subsection (2).
Subsection (2) of the 1955 Act merely emphasises the ambit of 
section 37(1) of the 1955 Act by stating that nothing in section 37(1) of 
the 1955 Act shall authorise the killing of a person who is not accused 
or suspected of having committed an offence mentioned in the First 
Schedule of the Act. However, the inclusion of this explanatory and 
limiting additional provision to section 37(1) really did not contribute 
materially to the development of the use of lethal force in effecting an 
11 Ibid.
12 Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. 
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arrest, as the First Schedules of both the 1917 and 1955 Acts are exactly 
the same.
In an early case decided under the 1955 Act, Justice Galgut held that 
the words ‘reasonable suspicion’ qualified the suspicion of the arrestor 
and had to be interpreted objectively; the grounds of suspicion must be 
those which induce a reasonable man to have the suspicion.13 It was 
furthermore held that section 37 of the 1955 Act only applied to the 
use of lethal force in effecting an arrest and not to the mere use of 
force.14 Similarly, in the case of Sambo v Milns,15 the court held that the 
test required, when dealing with section 37 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act,16 was (similar to the 1917 provision) an objective one. The court 
further held that in order to qualify for the protection of section 37, 
the person that made use of lethal force in effecting an arrest must 
discharge the onus of proving – on a balance of probabilities – that 
all the requirements laid down by the particular provision were met. 
These requirements included:17
that the person seeking the immunity conferred by the section had •	
reasonable grounds for suspecting the person killed (or injured) of 
having committed a First Schedule offence;
that he had attempted to arrest him;•	
that the person killed (or injured) fled or resisted; and•	
that he could not be arrested or prevented from escaping by other •	
means than killing (or injuring) him.
While the defendant in the Sambo v Milns case failed to prove all these 
requirements, the accused in the case of S v Scholtz,18 succeeded with 
his defence in terms of section 37 as the circumstances revealed that he 
did not take the decision to shoot lightly. The accused in this case was 
a constable in the South African Police (as it was then known) and he 
was standing trial on a charge of culpable homicide. He had arrested 
a driver who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and who 
was involved in a motor vehicle accident. However, on the way to the 
charge office the arrestee escaped and fled. The accused chased him 
and during this pursuit the accused gave numerous warnings to the 
arrestee to stop. The accused also fired a few warning shots and when 
it seemed as if the arrestee was about to get away, the accused shot and 
killed him. The court held that from the circumstances of this case, it 
appeared that the accused had not taken his decision to shoot lightly 
13 R v van Heerden 1958 (3) SA 150 (T) at 151 E-F. 
14 R v van Heerden supra (n13) at 152. 
15 1973 (4) SA 312 (T).
16 Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955.
17 Sambo v Milns supra (n15) at 321E-G.
18 1974 (1) SA 120 (W).
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and that he had done everything that could reasonably be expected of 
him to prevent the arrestee from escaping at that critical moment.
According to Milton, there appeared to be no ‘… prevailing view 
[at the time of writing – 1976] that the law in this regard is in need of 
reform …’19 It is for this reason that the amendment of this section 
in terms of section 49 of the 1977 Act constitutes a ‘… virtual re-
enactment of section 37 …’ in the 1955 Act.20
5.  The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
The two amendments to section 49 of the 1977 Act have further refined 
and shaped the use of lethal force in effecting an arrest in South African 
jurisprudence. This discussion relating to the 1977 Act is divided into 
two sections: the pre-constitutional era and the post-constitutional 
era. The reason for this division is to juxtapose the amendments to 
this particular provision of the 1977 Act after South Africa became a 
constitutional democracy with the provision as it stood during South 
Africa’s pre-constitutional history.
5.1  The use of lethal force in effecting an arrest in the pre-
constitutional era
The wording of the ‘old’ section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977, before South Africa’s constitutional democracy, differs markedly 
from the provisions in the 1917 and 1955 Acts. Section 49 read:
‘(1)  if any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting 
another, attempts to arrest such person and such person –
(a)  resists the attempt and cannot be arrested without the use of force; 
or
(b)  flees when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, 
or resists such attempt and flees, the person so authorised may, in 
order to effect the arrest, use such force as may in the circumstances 
be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent 
the person concerned from fleeing.
(2)  Where the person concerned is to be arrested for an offence referred to 
in Schedule 1 or is to be arrested on the ground of having committed 
such an offence, and the person authorised under this Act to arrest or 
to assist is arresting him cannot arrest him or prevent him from fleeing 
by other means than killing him, the killing shall be deemed to be 
justifiable homicide.’21
19 Milton op cit (n1) 151.
20 Cowling op cit (n1) 100.
21 Section 49 of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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While the scope of the use of lethal force in effecting an arrest is still 
available to any person authorised under the Act, as provided in the 
1955 version, the 1977 provision now makes a distinction between the 
use of force in effecting an arrest (section 49(1)) and the use of lethal 
force in affecting an arrest (section 49(2)). No mention is furthermore 
made of the reasonable grounds on which the arrestor must suspect 
the arrestee of having committed the said offences,22 but the force to 
be used in terms of section 49(1) is now rather limited to force that 
is reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance or to prevent the 
person concerned from fleeing.
In Prince v Minister of Law and Order,23 for example, the second 
and third defendants, who were members of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS), were involved in a high speed chase in which they 
pursued the plaintiffs after they tried to dodge a roadblock. The 
plaintiffs failed to stop after numerous warning shots were fired. 
One of the shots fired by the second and third defendants penetrated 
the vehicle the plaintiffs were driving, injuring the plaintiffs. The 
defendants, instituting an action for damages for bodily injury, relied 
on the protection of section 49(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977. The court held that the second and third defendants had 
acted on a reasonable suspicion and that there were no reasonable 
alternatives available to the defendants other than to fire shots at the 
plaintiffs.
With regard to the use of lethal force in effecting an arrest, the 
original section 49(2) still limited this aspect to offences listed 
in Schedule 1 of the Act and this list of offences differs somewhat 
from the list found in the 1917 and 1955 Acts. The most important 
differences are that offences related to coinage and offences against 
the laws for the prevention of illicit dealing in possession of precious 
metals, precious stones or the supply of toxicating liquor to natives or 
coloured people are not again included in Schedule 1. A new offence 
included in Schedule 1 of the Act is escaping from lawful custody, 
where the person concerned is in such custody in respect of any 
offence referred to in this Schedule 1 or is in such custody in respect 
of the offence of escaping from lawful custody.
5.2  The use of lethal force in effecting an arrest post-1996
In S v Makwanyane and another, the court held that:
22 Both the 1917 and 1955 Acts require that the arrestee must have committed the 
offence or that the arrestor must suspect on reasonable grounds that the arrestee 
committed the said offences.
23 1987 (4) SA 231 (E).
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‘The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and 
the source of all other personal rights in chapter 3 [of the Interim Constitution]. 
By committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human 
rights we are required to value these to rights above all others’.24
This value system, as embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, is a system founded on human dignity. It is a value 
system based on individual human worth to the survival of society. It 
calls on all, including the State, to protect and promote respect for life 
and human dignity.
In the case of S v Makwanyane and Another, Chaskalson P also 
pointed out that section 49(2) of the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act 
was a last resort in situations where an arrestor’s life was in danger. 
It was held that the provision is limited in its application in that other 
methods of subduing and arresting criminals should always be used 
where possible and the majority of the Constitutional Court contended 
that greater restrictions on the use of lethal force may be one of the 
consequences of the establishment of a constitutional state which 
respects every person’s right to life.25 Chaskalson P submitted that 
if the consequence of the Makwanyane judgment were to render this 
particular provision unconstitutional, the legislature would have to 
amend section 49 to bring it in line with the Constitution.26
In 1998 an amendment to section 49 was consequently passed 
by Parliament in terms of section 7 of the Judicial Matters Second 
Amendment Act 122 of 1998 and it came into effect in 2003. The 
implementation of the amendment by the Judicial Second Amendment 
Act was delayed for more than four years due to concerns raised by 
the SAPS and the Minister of Safety and Security. These concerns 
emanated from uncertainties surrounding the use of firearms by the 
SAPS, as this was an equivocal issue to its members. The Minister of 
Safety and Security, at that time, was of the view that the proposed 
1998 amendment only allowed members of the SAPS to shoot at 
criminals in self-defence, placing the police at risk of massive assaults 
from criminals.27
From 1998 when the amendment to section 49 was passed by 
Parliament, to the time that it came into effect in 2003, concerns 
regarding the constitutionality of the 1977 provision were also the 
subject of two further judgments delivered in the Supreme Court 
of Appeal and the Constitutional Court respectively. In Govender v 
24 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para [144]. 
25 S v Makwanyane and Another supra (n24) at para [140] & [144].
26 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
27 T van der Walt ‘The use of force in effecting arrest in South Africa and the 2010 Bill: A 
step in the right direction?’ (2011) 14(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 140. 
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Minister of Safety and Security,28 four youths stole a car and were later 
spotted by police officials. The police ordered the youths to stop the 
vehicle but their failure to do so resulted in a high-speed chase. The 
driver of the vehicle, the appellant’s son, eventually stopped the car 
and attempted to flee. The police pursued him on foot and warned 
him to stop. The officer then fired a warning shot and again shouted at 
him to stop but he still failed to do so. The officer, by then convinced 
that the suspect would escape, fired a shot at the suspect’s legs. The 
shot however injured the suspect’s spine and left him paralysed. The 
court held that,
‘[t]he words “use such force as may in the circumstances be reasonably 
necessary … to prevent the person concerned from fleeing” in section 49(1)
(b) of the [Criminal Procedure] Act must therefore generally speaking … be 
interpreted so as to exclude the use of a firearm or similar weapon unless 
the person authorised to arrest, or assist in an arresting … has reasonable 
grounds for believing 1) that the suspect poses an immediate threat of 
serious bodily harm to the [arrestor], or a threat of harm to members of the 
public; or 2) that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction 
or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm.’29
The judgment in this particular case effectively narrowed down the 
working of section 49(1) in relation to the use of lethal force but failed 
to consider the constitutionality of section 49(2).
In Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S 
v Walters,30 the Constitutional Court held that section 49(2) was 
unconstitutional in its entirety. This case arose from an incident in 
which a business owner shot and killed a burglar who broke into 
his business premises. The business owner and his son pursued the 
burglar, who was trying to escape by jumping over a fence and they 
shot and killed him.31 The accused contended that the shooting was 
justified in terms of section 49(1)(b) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977, while the State argued that section 49 was inconsistent 
with the Constitution and therefore had no effect.32 The Constitutional 
Court also interpreted section 49(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1977 so as to exclude the use of a firearm or similar weapon unless 
28 2001 (4) SA 278 (SCA).
29 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security supra (n28) at para [24].
30 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC); Also see M Watney ‘The final word on the use of force during 
arrest: Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters’ (2003) 4 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 775-783. 
31 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters supra (n30) at 
paras [8] & [9].
32 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters supra (n30) at 
paras [15]-[22]. 
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the person authorised to arrest, or assisting in the arrest of a fleeing 
suspect has reasonable grounds for believing:
that the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious bodily harm •	
to him or her, or a threat of harm to members of the public; or
that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or •	
threatened infliction of serious bodily harm.33
Kriegler J indicated that this interpretation of section 49(1)(b) was 
constitutionally sound and saved it from invalidation. In delivering the 
judgment, Kriegler J furthermore said that
‘[i]f one accepts the test in Govender as establishing the prerequisites to any 
use of a firearm, there can be little doubt that the same requirements should 
at the very least be preconditions to an arrester who shoots and kills the 
fugitive’.34
With regard to section 49(2) Kriegler J held that,
‘[i]f due recognition is to be given to the rights limited by the subsection and 
the extent of their limitation, the resort to Schedule 1 … in order to draw 
the line between serious cases [that warrant] the potential of deadly use of 
force and those that do not, comprehensively fails the test of reasonableness 
justifiability postulated by section 36(1) of the Constitution.’35
Moreover, section 49(2) inherently inclines unreasonably towards the 
arrestor. The judge indicated that ‘the purpose of arrest’ should be to 
bring persons who are suspected of committing crimes before a court 
of law and it should not be used to punish a suspect.36 Where arrest is 
called for, ‘force may be used only when it is necessary in order to carry 
out the arrest’ and ‘only the least degree of force reasonably necessary 
may be used.’37 ‘In deciding what degree of force is both reasonable and 
necessary, all the circumstances must be taken into account, including 
the threat of violence the suspect poses to the arrester or others, and 
the nature and circumstances of the offence the suspect is suspected 
of having committed.’38 The force used in effecting the arrest should 
furthermore be ‘proportional to all these circumstances.’39 And, it was 
held that a fatal shooting in order to effect an arrest, as in the Walters 
33 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters supra (n30) at 
para [38].
34 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters supra (n30) at 
para [40].
35 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters supra (n30) at 
para [45]. 
36 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others in re S v Walters supra (n30) at 
para [54].
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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case, will generally only be reasonable if the ‘suspect poses a threat 
of violence to the arrester or others’ or if the suspect is ‘suspected 
on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are 
no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest, whether at that 
time or later.’40 The court further held that the above ‘limitations in no 
way [limit the] rights of an arrestor attempting to carry out an arrest[,] 
to kill a suspect in [private] defence.’41
The amended section 49, which was passed by Parliament in 1998 
and only came into effect after the Govender and Walters judgments, 
addressed the shortcomings identified in both these cases by 
emphasising the role of reasonableness in the use of force in effecting 
an arrest, introducing the concept of proportionality42 and providing 
for strict requirements to be adhered to.43 Section 7 of the Judicial 
Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998 reads as follows:
‘(1)  for the purposes of this section –
a)  ‘arrestor’ means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to 
assist in arresting a a suspect; and
b)  ‘suspect’ means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has or 
had a reasonable suspicion that the person is committing or has 
committed an offence.
(2)  If the arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the 
attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that 
an attempt to arrest him has been made, and the suspect cannot be 
arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to arrest, 
use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the 
circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from 
fleeing. Provided that the arrestor is justified in terms of this section in 
using deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous 
bodily harm to a suspect, only if he believes on reasonable grounds –
a)  that the force is immediately necessary for the purposes of protecting 
the arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other 
person from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm;
b)  that there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent 
or future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or
c)  that the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of 
a forcible and serious nature and involves the use of life threatening 
violence or a strong possibility that it will cause grievous bodily 
harm.’
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 This notion of proportionality is also evident from this provisions common law roots, 
where the serious cases of outlawry and felonies were the only circumstances that 
warranted the use of deadly force to effect an arrest; Cowling op cit (n1) 117.
43 Also see CR Snyman ‘Geregverdigde doodslag by inhegtenisneming: Die bepalings 
van die nuwe artikel 49 van die Strafproseswet’ (2004) 15(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 
540-542. 
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Section 49(1) now provides definitions for the terms ‘arrestor’ and 
‘suspect’ respectively. The term arrestor, in terms of this amendment, 
still provides for the broader inclusion of any person authorised 
under the Act to arrest a suspect. This is similar to the 1955 and 1977 
amendments, while the 1917 provision only made reference to peace 
officers and private persons authorised in terms of the Act. Section 
49(2), which only regulated the use of lethal force in the 1977 Act, 
now consolidates the use of lethal and non-lethal force making a clear 
distinction between the two. In situations where non-deadly force 
is used, subsection (2) specifically provides that the force used by 
the arrestor must be ‘reasonably necessary and proportional in the 
circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect 
from fleeing.’ This test is known as the proportionality test and the 
value of this criterion is that the court has to balance various factors 
against each other. Factors that may be relevant in this regard are: The 
seriousness of the suspected offence; the degree of force used by the 
arrestor; whether or not the suspect was made aware of the fact that 
an attempt to arrest him had been made; the need for oral warning 
shots; and, the ability of the suspect to escape as well as the possibility 
that innocent bystanders may be injured due to the use of a firearm 
by the arrestor.44 The requirement that the force must be reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances, which was first introduced in the 1977 
Act, is consequently elaborated on in the 1998 amendment in that 
proportionality is now also required. This is significant as the 1998 
amendment is the first provision that explicitly requires proportionality 
between the force to be applied and the particular circumstances on 
the situation. In no preceding provision has proportionality been 
required.
Where lethal force is to be used, the arrestor will furthermore only 
be justified in his/her actions if he or she believes on reasonable 
grounds that: deadly force is immediately necessary to protect him- or 
herself or the person assisting him in the arrest from imminent or 
future death or grievous bodily harm,45 and there is a substantial 
risk that the suspect will cause imminent or future death or grievous 
bodily harm,46 or the offence for which the arrest is sought is in 
progress and is of a forcible and serious nature and involves the use 
of life-threatening violence, or a strong possibility that it will cause 
44 JJ Joubert (ed), PM Bekker, T Geldenhuys, JP Swanepoel, SS Terblanche, SE van der 
Merwe Criminal Procedure Handbook (9th ed) (2009) Chapter 7 at 98ff.
45 Section 49(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
46 Section 49(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; This requirement is similar 
to section 3 07(2)(b)(iv)(B) of the American Model Penal Code; MD Dubber Criminal 
Law: Model Penal Code (2002) 326-329; Snyman op cit (n43) 540. 
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grievous bodily harm.47 These three requirements relate to aspects 
of the reasonable belief of the arrestor. The first two requirements 
also formed the basis of the approach followed in the United States 
Supreme Court case of Tennessee v Garner,48 where the Supreme Court 
said that the shooting of the suspect by the police officer violated the 
Fourth Amendment. Justice White conceded that the police officers 
must have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat to 
the safety of the officers, or the community, if not arrested.49
The amended section 49, which was introduced by the Judicial 
Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998, represents a significant 
development from the 1917, 1955 and 1977 provisions. The test of 
proportionality is a new concept incorporated in the new section 49 
(2) and, in addition to the proportionality test, three requirements 
are included in subsection (2) which provide for a more stringent 
framework for the use of lethal force. All references to Schedule 1 of 
the Act and the list of offences to which the use of the lethal force 
provision is to be applied, are furthermore deleted. The omission of 
the reference to Schedule 1 offences can most probably be attributed 
to the more stringent framework that is set by the 1998 amendment 
for the use of lethal force in effecting an arrest; the requirement that 
the use of lethal force in effecting an arrest only be applied to certain 
serious offences, as listed in Schedule 1, is now no longer necessary.
Another interesting feature of the 1998 amendment is the provision 
made for an arrestor to use lethal force with respect to a future risk of 
death or grievous bodily injury by a suspect, a proviso which was not 
afforded under the previous provisions. This ‘future danger principle’ is 
a phrase that can however also be found in section 25 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code.50 The inclusion of this provision has been criticised 
by Bruce and Van der Walt as it requires members of the SAPS to 
make a judgement and perform their legal responsibilities under an 
ill-defined legal framework that may expose them to an enhanced 
risk of criminal prosecution.51 Bruce also argues that this ‘speculative 
abstraction’ required from members of the SAPS is unsuited for the 
South African context as in countries like Canada which incorporated 
the ‘future danger principle’ as part of their law there are lower violent 
crimes rates, and other countries are generally better able to maintain 
47 Section 49(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
48 471 U.S. 1,3 (1985). 
49 Tennessee v Garner supra (n48) at 3.
50 Snyman op cit (n43) 543.
51 See generally D Bruce ‘Interpreting the body count: South African statistics on lethal 
police violence’ (2005) 36(2) South African Review of Sociology 141–159; Van der Walt 
op cit (n27) 142.
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administrative mechanisms which can impose accountability in relation 
to such a standard.52
The 1998 amendment was criticised for being extremely risky for 
arrestors who potentially use lethal force in effecting an arrest, since 
the use of force in effecting an arrest required that the arrestor first had 
to decide what force would be reasonably necessary and proportional 
in the circumstances before acting. On the other hand, the use of lethal 
force in effecting an arrest provided more protection to the arrestor as 
the reasonable grounds listed in the Act and on which the arrestor’s 
actions had to be based, provided for more scope and possibility to 
have the arrestor’s actions justified. This incongruity was described by 
some as ‘the licence to flee’.53
6.  The new Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill, 2010
Although no case challenged the constitutionality of the 1998 
amendment, section 49 was widely criticised as ‘… being complex and 
confusing and lacking in legal clarity’.54 The SAPS raised concerns 
that the provision hampered the police in combating crime and 
questioned the interpretation and application of the text in terms of 
the appropriate training of police officers. It was even suggested that 
section 49 created a ‘right to flee’; protecting the rights of criminals 
more than the rights of law-abiding citizens and police officers.55
In 2009, Bheki Cele, the National Commissioner of Police announced 
that there were plans to further amend section 49 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as the current section was ambiguous.56 
A bill was consequently formulated, proposing various amendments 
to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, as amended by 
Section 7 of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 122 of 1998. 
The proposed section 49 reads as follows:
‘Use of force in effecting arrest
49. (1) For the purposes of this section –
(a)  ‘arrestor’ means any person authorised under this Act to arrest or to 
assist in arresting a suspect; [and]
52 See Bruce op cit (n51) 141–159; Van der Walt op cit (n27) 142.
53 Cowling op cit (n1) 116.
54 Van der Walt op cit (n27) 142; See in general D Bruce ‘Reasonable force? The use of 
force as a learning process’ (2000) 20(8) Crime and Conflict 16-19. 
55 Van der Walt op cit (n27) 143.
56 National Commissioner of the Police, General Bheki Cele, at the Business Against 
Crime South Africa (BACSA) Breakfast Meeting, Sun Hotel, Sandton, 28 October 2009, 
available at http://www.info.gov.za/speech/ DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=5862&ti
d=6007, accessed on 23 August 2011. 
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(b)  ‘suspect’ means any person in respect of whom an arrestor has [or had] 
a reasonable suspicion that such person is committing or has committed 
an offence; and
(c)  ‘deadly force’ means force that is likely to cause serious bodily harm or 
death and includes, but is not limited to, shooting at a suspect with a 
firearm.
 (2) If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists 
the attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that 
an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be 
arrested without the use of force, the arrestor may, in order to effect the 
arrest, use such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in 
the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to prevent the suspect from 
fleeing: Provided that the arrestor may use deadly force only if –
(a)  the suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or any other 
person; or
(b)  the suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily 
harm and there are no other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, 
whether at that time or later.’
Some of the key elements of this new provision, as set out in the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Bill B39 – 2010, will now be discussed.
Section 49(1)(c), an additional subsection to section 49(1), now 
defines deadly force. This is a valuable addition as it addresses any 
potential ambiguity that may surround the interpretation of deadly 
force in terms of section 49. This insertion is furthermore necessary as 
the words have been deleted from subsection (2): ‘that is intended or is 
likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a suspect’, leaving the 
concept of lethal force in effecting an arrest open to interpretation.
The three requirements relating to aspects of the reasonable belief 
of the arrestor and relevant for the use of deadly force have also 
been amended. Now, provision is only made for two requirements: 
Deadly force may now only be used if the suspect poses a threat 
of serious violence to the arrestor or any other person,57 or the 
suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily 
harm and there are no other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, 
whether at that time or later.58 The deletion of the phrase ‘any person 
lawfully assisting the arrestor’ implies that the arrestor is the only 
person with authority to use lethal force when affecting an arrest. This 
omission could have both a positive and negative effect. A positive 
implication is that the arrestor, who is assumed to have authority to 
57 Section 49(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
58 Compare this to the summary provided by Kriegler J in Walters on the practical effect 
of the Govender and Walters judgments; Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and 
Others: S v Walters 2002 (2) SACR 105 (CC) at para [52]; Van der Walt op cit (n27) 144-
145.
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exercise the use of deadly force, will be the only person designated 
to employ such power in terms of the Act. A negative implication 
would however be that there is no expressed statement as to the extent 
to which a person assisting an arrestor in a particular situation may 
provide such assistance.
The deletion of the word ‘grievous’ and the substitution thereof with 
the word ‘serious’, presents a series of questions and concerns that need 
to be addressed. The Oxford Concise Dictionary59 defines ‘grievous’ 
as ‘severe’, and ‘serious’ as ‘not slight nor negligible’. If these words 
are construed in this context it indicates that ‘serious’ constitutes a less 
severe form of ‘grievous’, which would in turn mean that the insertion 
of the word ‘serious’ amounts to a less stringent criterion for the use 
of deadly force. This subsection could now be interpreted to denote 
the following: It would afford an arrestor a broader scope in which 
to exercise such discretionary powers and would limit any liability 
incurred by him/her in doing so. It would furthermore restrict the 
boundaries within which the arrestor has to remain in order not to 
violate the provisions provided for in the amended section 49.
In addition, the ‘future danger principle’ has been omitted and 
the ‘threat of danger’ requirement postulated in the Walters case has 
rather been included in the provision.60 Van der Walt however argues 
that the ‘future danger principle’ is actually still incorporated within 
the provisions of section 49 as the bill – contrary to the decision in 
Walters – does not include the requirement that the suspect must offer 
an immediate threat of serious bodily harm to the arrestor or members 
of the public in general. Van der Walt argues that this omission of the 
word ‘immediate’ implies that deadly force may also be used when the 
arrestor reasonably believes that the suspect offers a serious threat of 
danger to him or others at any time and not only at the time of the 
arrest.61
7.  Conclusion
It is evident from the above exposition that from the very first 
enactment of a provision regarding the use of lethal force to effect 
an arrest in South African criminal procedure, the provision has been 
subject to numerous amendments in order to provide greater clarity 
on when exactly, and in what circumstances, an arrestor may resort 
59 S Wehmeier (Ed) Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000) 565 & 1167, 
respectively. 
60 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: S v Walters supra (n58) at paras 
[40] & [52]; Van der Walt op cit (n27) 144.
61 Van der Walt op cit (n27) 146.
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to such extremes. However, despite these numerous and far-reaching 
amendments, the provision remains, to this day, controversial.
The key element of the 1917 provision was the notion of objectivity 
on the part of the arrestor when deciding to make use of potentially 
lethal force. From the 1955 amendments onward, it is noteworthy that 
numerous requirements and limitations have continuously been added 
in order to limit the arrestor’s ability to make use of such extreme 
measures. And, while the main focus in the 1977 amendments was 
the concept of reasonableness, the 1998 amendment also included a 
proportionality test. With regard to the 1998 amendment, it is said that 
a major fear of the SAPS was that the provision would limit members 
of the police service to only shoot a suspect in self-defence. This, Van 
der Walt rightly argues, is incorrect as the provision on the use of 
(lethal) force in effecting an arrest has never had any bearing on the 
common-law right to self-defence but is rather exclusively dealing with 
the right to use (lethal) force to stop a fleeing suspect from getting 
away.62 This is also evident from the 2010 Bill, in section 49(2)(b), 
which provides for the use of lethal force even in circumstances where 
the arrestor’s life or bodily integrity is not even at stake.63
But, have these amendments been successful in clarifying the 
approach to be used by police officers when exercising their discretion 
to make use of potentially lethal force in order to effect an arrest? We 
respectfully agree with De Vos in this regard, when he says that:
‘The suggestions by the Ministry that it would be able to change the wording 
of section 49(2) to “clarify” section 49(2) and to provide clear rules not 
requiring the exercise of a discretion, is just plain daft.’64
The amended wording of legislation cannot altogether inform the 
exercise of discretion by a police officer who is faced with a range of 
dangerous situations on a daily basis. The only viable solution to the 
controversy surrounding the use of lethal force would be to address the 
internal mechanisms of the SAPS, such as providing adequate training 
to police officials. Any attempt to remedy the problems experienced in 
practice with the use of force in effecting arrests by amending section 
49, will only create a false sense of security for police officials,65 
as they could still incur criminal liability if they do not apply their 
discretion in an appropriate manner.
62 Van der Walt op cit (n27) 146; For a contrary view see Snyman op cit (n43) 536–549 
and D Bruce ‘Killing and the Constitution – arrest and the use of lethal force’ (2003) 
19(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 430–454.
63 Van der Walt op cit (n27) 146.
64 P de Vos ‘If we start killing our own people we all lose’, 13 November 2009, available at 
constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/if-we-start-killing-our-own-people-we-all-lose/, accessed 
on 29 July 2011.
65 Ibid.
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